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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The following parties or attorneys are now or have 
been interested in this litigation or any related proceedings. 
1. First Security Mortgage Company was the named 
defendant when this litigation commenced. On June 3, 1988, 
Judge Pat B, Brian entered an Order whereby Leucadia Financial 
Corporation was substituted for First Security Mortgage Company 
for all purposes. (R. 844-46) Leucadia Financial Corporation is 
asserting the rights of First Security Mortgage Company in this 
appeal. 
2. Craig L. Taylor, Esq. , Anthony B. Quinn, Esq. and 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg, Esq. of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker previously 
appeared as counsel for First Security Mortgage Company prior to 
the above-mentioned substitution of parties. 
3. All other parties are reflected in the caption, 
and all other counsel have entered their appearance. 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to section 78-2-2(3)(a), Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was Kelley required under the agreement to waive 
the title defects and claims for property damage before he would 
be entitled to specific performance? 
2. Was Kelley7 s tender of performance defective 
because conditional and therefore insufficient to enable Kelley 
to bring this action for specific performance? 
3. Was Kelley required to make an unconditional 
tender of performance before the closing date in order to 
maintain an action for specific performance? 
4. Was Kelley excused from tendering his own 
performance? 
5. Was the Court of Appeals correct in ordering that 
judgment be entered in favor of Leucadia? 
In reviewing a case disposed of by summary judgment, 
the reviewing court determines whether or not there are genuine 
issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment and the 
correctness of the application of controlling law. Ferree v. 
State. 784 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); Themv v. Seagull Enter, . 
Inc. . 595 P. 2d 526 (Utah 1979). 
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STATEMENT QF THE QAgE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff-Petitioner William R. Kelley, Jr. ("Kelley" ) 
commenced this action against First Security Mortgage Company 
("First Security").1 In this action, Kelley requested a 
declaratory judgment for the interpretation of rights, status 
and legal relationship under an Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
("Agreement"), sought a decree of specific performance requiring 
First Security to convey certain property as contracted in the 
Agreement, and prayed for an abatement of the purchase price and 
damages for breach of the Agreement. (R. 1-11) 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Kelley commenced this action on September 22, 1987. 
On November 10, 1987, First Security filed a Motion to Dismiss 
and for Attorneys' Fees. (R. 72-73) In response, Kelley filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on November 27, 1987. 
(R. 137-39) The Court entered its Order granting Kelley Partial 
Summary Judgment on February 3, 1988. (R. 562-64) This Order 
granted Kelley7 s request for a decree of specific performance 
and retained jurisdiction over the matter to determine whether 
Kelley was entitled to an abatement of the purchase price and 
1
 First Security was the named defendant when this 
litigation commenced. By order of the Court, Leucadia Financial 
Corporation was substituted for First Security and is asserting 
the rights of First Security in this appeal. (R. 844-46) 
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damages. (R. 562-64) First Security filed a Motion to Amend 
Judgment (R. 343-344), an Objection to Proposed Order Granting 
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 345-46), and a Motion for 
Reconsideration (R. 907), all of which were denied by the Court. 
First Security filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
relating to Kelley's claims for punitive damages and on May 6, 
1988, the Court entered its Order which, among other things, 
granted summary judgment in favor of First Security. (R. 812-14) 
On the same day, the Court found the parties had otherwise 
settled all claims relating to the amount of damages to be 
awarded Kelley and entered its Final Judgment and Decree of 
Specific Performance. (R. 815-18) 
Leucadia Financial Corporation ("Leucadia") was 
substituted for First Security on June 3, 1988 for purposes of 
appeal concerning the decree of specific performance and all 
orders or judgments. (R. 844-46) In that capacity, Leucadia 
filed its notice of appeal on June 3, 1988. (R. 847-49) This 
appeal was commenced by Leucadia from the Order of Partial 
Summary Judgment signed by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on 
February 1, 1988, the Final Judgment and Decree of Specific 
Performance, signed by the Honorable Pat B. Brian on May 6, 1988 
and the Order, signed by the Honorable Pat B. Brian on May 6, 
1988. All of these orders and judgments were entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, Utah. On 
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August 22, 1988, the Supreme Court notified the parties that the 
case was poured over to the Court of Appeals for disposition, 
c. pjLgpositiQn by the ut»ti Court of Appeals 
The Court of Appeals issued an unpublished opinion on 
January 5, 1990, in which it reversed the trial court and 
directed that judgment be entered in favor of Leucadia. (The 
Opinion is Appendix 1. ) The Court of Appeals entered an Order 
denying Kelley's Motion for Rehearing on February 16, 1990. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
The facts before the District Court and the Utah Court 
of Appeals were as follows: 
1. The Agreement Between The Parties. 
On or about March 2, 1987, First Security Mortgage 
Company ("First Security"), as seller, and William R. Kelley, 
Jr. ("Kelley"), as buyer, executed an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement (the "Agreement") for the purchase of real property. 
A copy of the Agreement and addenda thereto are Appendix 2 to 
this brief. (R. 14-22) Pursuant to this Agreement, Kelley 
agreed to purchase and First Security agreed to convey title to 
certain property situated at 320 West Snows Lane, Park City, 
Utah ("Subject Property"). (R. 14) 
There were several addenda to the Agreement which 
altered the Agreement only by extending the time for closing. 
In the first addendum to the Agreement, the parties agreed to 
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extend the closing to April 20, 1987. (R. 18) Thereafter, the 
parties extended the closing date to on or before June 1, 1987 
(R. 19); on or before July 1, 1987 (R. 20); on or before 
August 31, 1987 (R. 21). By letter dated September 4, 1987, 
the closing date was extended to September 15, 1987 (R. 114); 
by letter dated September 14, 1987, the time for closing was 
extended until September 22, 1987 (R. 116). 
2. Th$ Terpig of The Agreement. 
The parties bargained for the following terms in their 
Agreement: 
a) The property is sold "as is" without warranty with 
title to be conveyed by special warranty deed. (R.16; 
Appendix 2) 
b) The agreement is conditioned on seller furnishing 
good and marketable title to the property as evidenced by a 
current policy of title insurance. (R. 16; Appendix 2, 113) 
c) Seller is to provide a current certified survey of 
the property. (R. 18; Appendix 2) 
d) In the event of a title defect, Buyer is to give 
Seller written notice of his objections to title. Thereafter, 
Seller is required to cure the defects to which Buyer has 
objected, if such can be done through escrow at closing. If the 
defects are not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, 
the Buyer has the option of waiving the defects and proceeding 
-5-
with the closing or he may require the Seller to return the 
earnest money deposit and the Agreement will be null and void. 
(R. 15; Appendix 2, 1FG) 
e) In the event that title cannot be made insurable 
without exceptions through an escrow agreement at closing, the 
Buyer may either (1) waive the defects and proceed with the 
sale, or (2) terminate the Agreement and have his earnest money 
refunded. (R. 15; Appendix 2, 1lH) 
f) In the event there is loss or damage to the 
property between the date of the Agreement and the date of 
closing by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts 
of God, and the cost to repair such damage exceeds ten percent 
of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may either proceed 
with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or 
replace damaged property prior to closing, or declare this 
Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten 
percent of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to 
repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged 
property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as 
agreed. (R. 17; Appendix 2, HP) 
g) With regard to the extension of closing dates, 
time is of the essence of the agreement. (R. 17; Appendix 2, 1fQ) 
h) This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of 
the parties. (R. 17; Appendix 2, H D 
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3. The pjgpvte. 
At the time the Agreement was executed, both Kelley 
and First Security understood the Subject Property to include 
land which was enclosed by fences, a stream, a spring and a 
pond. (R. 276) Shortly after the Agreement was executed, First 
Security, in accordance with the Agreement, had a survey 
conducted of the Subject Property. Through this survey, First 
Security discovered that the Quit-Claim Deed by which it claimed 
its interest in the property contained an erroneous property 
description which did not coincide with the natural boundaries 
of the property. (R. 143) This faulty property description was 
a result of a prior erroneous survey and previous conveyances of 
the property incorporating the description from the erroneous 
survey. (R. 81, 150) The result of this erroneous description 
was that the boundary shifted approximately 15.22 feet to the 
south such that neither the spring, the stream nor the pond 
would be included in the conveyance contemplated by the 
Agreement. (R. 143) 
In addition, First Security believes that one or more 
of the adjacent landowners came on the property and sawed off a 
pipe supplying water to the pond located on the property and 
removed fish from the pond. (R. 82) Consequently, the pond 
virtually dried up and the water feeding the pond from the pipe 
has been diverted from the property. (R. 82) 
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First Security attempted to resolve these problems 
with the landowners of the adjacent property, but was unable to 
do so through negotiation. (R. 357) Accordingly, First Security 
commenced a lawsuit against the landowners to recover for 
damages to the property, to compel the determination of any 
claims adverse to First Security' s title, to establish correct 
boundaries, to quiet title to and obtain a declaration of First 
Security' s rights with respect to the property. (R. 23-59) It 
became clear, however, that the adjacent landowners would not 
resolve the dispute without substantial litigation which First 
Security was unwilling to undertake without reimbursement from 
Kelley. (R. 114-15) 
4. The Termination Of The Agreement. 
By August 31, 1987, the last closing date mutually 
agreed to by the parties, neither party had performed nor 
tendered performance under the Agreement. (R. 359) On 
September 4, 1987, First Security sent Kelley a letter 
indicating that resolution of the boundary dispute and property 
damage could not be done through negotiation but, rather, would 
require substantial litigation. (R. 114-15) Accordingly, First 
Security offered Kelley the options bargained for in the 
Agreement in the event of a dispute rendering title to the 
property unmarketable or in the case of damage to property prior 
to closing. Namely, Kelley could either waive the defects and 
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proceed to closing or First Security would return the earnest 
money deposit. (R. 114-15; R. 15 1fG; R. 17 HP) A copy of First 
Security's letter is Appendix 3 to this brief. Under these 
terms, the closing was scheduled for September 15, 1987. 
At Kelley's request, the closing date was extended until 
September 22, 1987. (R. 114-15, 116) A copy of First Security's 
letter extending the closing to September 22, 1987 is Appendix 4 
to this brief. 
On September 22, 1987, however, Kelley declined to 
close under either of the agreed-upon options stated in the 
letter and required by the Agreement. (R. 119-21) Instead, 
Kelley tendered the down payment in escrow, and stated that such 
tender was conditioned on First Security resolving the boundary 
dispute, rectifying the property damage, and clearing title 
prior to closing. (R. 120) A copy of Kelley's tender is 
Appendix 5 to this brief. Thereafter, First Security offered to 
extend the closing deadline to October 8, 1987, if, in 
accordance with the Agreement, Kelley desired to purchase 
the property "as is." (R. 296) Kelley refused this offer, 
however, stating that First Security was obligated to resolve 
the disputes and then convey the property to Kelley. (R. 297) 
Inasmuch as First Security was unable and did not agree to 
repair or replace the damaged property, and because Kelley did 
not waive the defects in the title and close the sale on or 
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before September 22, 1987, First Security executed a release of 
Kelley' s earnest money deposit on September 24, 1987. 
(R. 122-25) 
Kelley filed this action on September 22, 1987, 
requesting an order of the Court that First Security was 
obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, repair or replace the 
property, and then convey the property to Kelley. (R.7) 
5. The Sale Of The Subject Property To Leucadia. 
On September 25, 1987, First Security received an 
earnest money offer to purchase the Subject Property from 
Leucadia, and began negotiating a purchase and sale agreement 
with Leucadia. (R. 362) On November 2, 1987, First Security and 
Leucadia entered into a binding Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
for the sale of the Subject Property. (R. 362) On November 25, 
1987, the Subject Property was sold to Leucadia. (R. 362) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Kelley' s failure to waive the title defects and any 
claim for property damage resulted in termination of the 
Agreement pursuant to its own terms. Further, an unconditional 
tender of performance by Kelley was a prerequisite to this 
action for specific performance. Kelley' s tender of performance 
was conditional on First Security providing a remedy not 
required by the Agreement and, therefore, Kelley was precluded 
from maintaining this action. Moreover, Kelley failed to make 
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an adequate tender prior to the expiration of the Agreement. 
Accordingly, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals that the 
Agreement terminated was correct as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. KELLEY' S REFUSAL TO WAIVE CLAIMS REGARDING TITLE DEFECTS 
AND PROPERTY DAMAGE CAUSED THE AGREEMENT TO TERMINATE BY 
ITS OWN TERMS. 
The Agreement provides the options available to Kelley 
in the event of title defects or property damage due to 
vandalism. As to title defects, the Agreement provides that if 
a defect is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, 
Kelley could either (i) waive the defect and proceed to closing, 
or (ii) refuse to waive the defect, and have his earnest money 
deposit returned and the Agreement terminated. (R.15; 
Appendix 2, 1fflG and H)2 In the event of property damage caused 
by vandalism, the Agreement provides that Kelley may (1) proceed 
to closing if First Security agrees to repair or replace the 
damaged property, or (2) declare the Agreement null and void if 
2
 Unlike Paragraph H of the Agreement, Paragraph G does not 
specifically state that the buyer must waive any title defects 
as a condition to proceeding with the transaction. However, 
that condition is implicit in Paragraph G. Otherwise, the last 
sentence of Paragraph G has no meaning or purpose. Also, such 
interpretation is supported by the express provision of 
Paragraph H, which states specifically that if title defects are 
not curable through an escrow agreement, the buyer must waive 
the defects to proceed with the transaction. 
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First Security does not agree to repair or replace the damaged 
property. (R. 17; Appendix 2, HP) If First Security refuses to 
repair or replace damaged property, then Kelley could proceed 
with the closing only if he waived any claims for such damage. 3 
First Security by its letter of September 4, 1987 
(Appendix 3) offered Kelley his options under the Agreement, 
which were either to waive the title defects and close the 
transaction or, alternatively, to permit the Agreement to 
terminate and receive a refund of his deposit. First Security 
did not agree in its letter to repair the damaged property. In 
his response by letter dated September 22, 1987 (Appendix 5), 
Kelley refused these options and demanded, as a condition to 
closing, that First Security resolve the boundary dispute and 
the water rights problem and repair or replace the property 
damage caused by vandalism. (R. 61) Kelley's response to First 
Security's letter was clearly and unequivocally a refusal to 
waive the title defects. As a result, the Agreement terminated 
by its own terms under Paragraphs G and H. Furthermore, since 
First Security did not agree to repair or replace the damaged 
3
 Paragraph P does not clearly state the remedy available 
to a purchaser in the event the seller refuses to repair or 
replace property damage caused by vandalism. However, the only 
reasonable interpretation of the Paragraph is that the Agreement 
terminates unless the purchaser waives property damage claims. 
Otherwise, there is no need or purpose for the language in the 
Paragraph concerning the agreement of the seller to repair or 
replace. 
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property, and Kelley did not waive any claim for such damage, 
the Agreement also terminated under Paragraph P. 
Notwithstanding his September 22 letter, Kelley argues 
that he did not intend to terminate the Agreement and that he 
would have waived the title defects (and presumably any claim 
for property damage) if he was required to do so. (Kelley' s 
Brief, p. 35 n. 9) The issue, however, is not whether Kelley 
intended to terminate the Agreement. The issue under Paragraphs 
G, H and P of the Agreement is whether Kelley waived the title 
defects and claims for property damage. 4 In his September 22 
letter Kelley not only refused to waive the defects, but 
insisted that First Security cure the problems. Since Kelley 
refused to waive the defects, the Agreement terminated 
automatically, regardless of his unexpressed intent. See Reno 
v. Beckett, 555 F. 2d 757, 767 (10th Cir. 1977). 5 
Paragraph H specifically provides that in the event of 
title defects, the Agreement will automatically terminate by its 
own terms, unless Kelley waives the defects. 
In addition, Kelley seems to argue that even if the 
September 22 letter could be construed as a failure to waive 
title defects and claims for property damage, he was 
subsequently willing to do so. After September 22, it was too 
late for Kelley to alter his position because the Agreement had 
terminated. See the discussion concerning the time of the 
essence provision of the Agreement at Argument IV, commencing 
infra at 30. 
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A clause in a land sales contract providing for 
cancellation of the contract in the event of a title defect is 
not an uncommon provision. Professor Powell notes: 
One of the issues that may arise in an 
action for specific performance of a 
contract to sell an interest in land is the 
marketability of the landowner' s title. 
Some contracts avoid or at least minimize 
the likelihood of litigation or of the 
vendor' s liability by providing that if the 
title proves unmarketable, the agreement is 
canceled and a refund of the deposit is to 
be made to the purchaser. 
6A R. Powell, The L»w pf fiefr! Property 11 925[2}[b], 84-24 & 25 
(1990). Such provisions are binding and are enforceable by the 
seller, at least in the absence of fault or bad faith by the 
vendor. Lanna v. Greene, 175 Conn. 453, 399 A. 2d 837, 840-841 
(1978); Scerbo v. Robinson. 63 App. Div. 2d 1096, 406 NYS2d 370, 
371 (1978); Robison v. Compton. 97 Idaho 615, 549 P. 2d 274, 276 
(1976); Sawl v. Kwiatkowski, 349 Mass. 712, 212 N. E. 2d 228 
(1965); De Propris v. Smith, 342 Mich. 457, 70 N. W. 2d 712, 713 
(1955).6 
It is argued, primarily in the amicus curiae briefs, 
that Leucadia' s interpretation of Paragraphs G and H of the 
Agreement eliminates the recognized right of a purchaser to seek 
6
 In Sawl, the court defined "fault" to mean conduct by the 
seller subsequent to the purchase agreement and tending to 
impair the seller's title. 212 N. E. 2d at 230. Also see, 
Trabucco v. Nelson, 8 Mass. App. 641, 396 N. E. 2d 466, 468 
(1979). 
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specific performance, with an abatement of the purchase price, 
in the event of title defects. In both briefs the case of 
Castaano v. Church, 552 P. 2d 1282 (Utah 1976), is cited for the 
proposition that the purchaser has such a right. However, the 
Castaano court recognized that this remedy can be contractually 
modified. The court stated: 
At the time of the execution of the 
contract, [sellers] knew there was no 
existing water right to the well. They 
undertook the duty to procure such a right, 
but tfrey TOfle no provision in the contract 
to excuse them, if the state engineer did 
not grant their change application to divert 
a water right to the well. 
552 P. 2d at 1284. Contrary to the contention of the amicus 
parties, the Castaano court recognized that any right of 
specific .performance with abatement can be contractually 
modified. 7 
The issue of the effect of contractual provisions on 
the remedy of specific performance was addressed in Lanna v. 
Greene, 175 Conn. 453, 399 A. 2d 837 (1978). In that case, a 
purchaser brought an action against the seller seeking, among 
other things, specific performance of a real estate contract and 
In the amicus curiae briefs, the cases of Eliason v. 
Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980), Tanner v. Baadsaaard. 612 P. 2d 
345 (Utah 1980), Reed v. Alvev. 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980), and 
Huck v. Haves. 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977) are also cited for the 
notion that a purchaser can specifically enforce an agreement. 
Those cases are not instructive. The Court did not address in 
those cases the effect of contractual remedies on the right to 
specific performance or abatement of the purchase price. 
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damages for breach. The agreement provided that if the sellers 
were unable to deliver marketable title, the purchaser could 
elect either to accept the title subject to encumbrances with no 
reduction in the purchase price, or to reject title and recover 
its deposit. 399 A. 2d at 839. The court first noted that 
generally, in the event of unmarketable title, a purchaser may 
elect to have the contract specifically performed to the extent 
of the seller' s ability, with an abatement in the purchase 
price. JjJ. at 840. The court then stated: 
It is also fundamental, however, that vendor 
and vendee may contract to limit their 
remedies for breach. 
Id. The court concluded that the contractual remedy of waiver 
or refund was exclusive and intended for the benefit of both 
parties, and that the purchasers were precluded from any other 
relief, including abatement. 
In Robison v. Compton, 97 Idaho 615, 549 P. 2d 274 
(1976), the court held that remedy provisions concerning title 
defects similar to those in this case are binding. In holding 
that the purchasers were not entitled to specific performance 
and an abatement of the price, the court stated: 
The Earnest Money Agreement also contains 
the following provision: "The earnest money 
deposited herein shall be refunded to Buyer 
and this Agreement voided . . . if 
merchantable title cannot be delivered 
within a reasonable time. •' By including 
this clause in their Agreement, the parties 
have agreed as to what the remedy will be in 
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case of the failure or inability of the 
vendor to provide merchantable title. Such 
a stipulation is binding, at least in the 
absence of bad faith, and will foreclose an 
action for a different remedy. 
549 P. 2d at 276. See also Sawl v. Kwiatkowski, 349 Mass. 712, 
212 N. E. 2d 228 (1965). 8 
It is also argued by the amicus parties that if 
Leucadia's interpretation of Paragraphs G and H is correct, a 
seller could avoid a sales contract by simply encumbering title. 
This argument illustrates the distinction between encumbrances 
on title that can be cleared through escrow and defects in title 
so fundamental they cannot be cleared by the payment of money 
into escrow. If, as suggested by the amicus parties, the seller 
encumbered title such as by incurring a lien on the property, 
such an encumbrance could be cured through escrow and hence 
would not relieve the seller of his obligations under Paragraphs 
G and H of the sales contract. Moreover, the termination 
provision found in those paragraphs would not be available to a 
seller acting in bad faith or who is at fault. In Trabucco v. 
8
 The Utah Association of Realtors cites Ace Realty, Inc. 
v. Looney. 531 P. 2d 1377 (Okla. 1974) for the argument that the 
contractual remedies contained in the Agreement were for the 
benefit of the purchaser, who could waive those provisions and, 
therefore, still seek specific performance. IsL at 1380. Such 
conclusion by the Ace court, if indeed it was its conclusion, 
was reached without discussion or citation to other authority. 
This conclusion is obviously contrary to the holdings in Lanna 
v. Gregne, ggerbp
 Yt Rgfringpn, Robison v. Compton. De Propris v. 
Smith, and Sawl v. Kwiatkowski, supra text at p. 14. 
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Nelson. 8 Mass. App. 641, 396 N. E. 2d 466 (1979), referring to a 
clause in a land sales contract that provided for termination in 
the event the seller is unable to convey good title, the court 
stated: 
The clause, therefore, does not protect a 
seller who is not acting in good faith and 
who does not intend to carry out the 
agreement. (citation omitted). 
L£. a t 468. fo$Q g ee , fcctnrei yT C reene , 399 A. 2d 837, 841 (Conn. 
1978); Sawl v. Kwiatkowski, 349 Mass. 712, 212 N. E. 2d 228, 230 
(1965). 
The amicus curiae argue that the interpretation of 
Paragraphs G and H of the Agreement by Leucadia effectively 
eliminate the provisions of Paragraph N of the Agreement. 9 
Paragraph N is a general remedy clause, and does not address 
specifically the remedies available in the event of defects in 
title. It is fundamental that contractual provisions addressing 
a specific issue control and preclude application of a general 
9
 Paragraph N provides in part: 
In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may 
elect to either retain the earnest money as 
liquidated damages or to institute suit to 
enforce any rights of Seller. In the event 
of default by Seller, or if this sale fails 
to close because of the nonsatisfaction of 
any express condition or contingency to 
which the sale is subject pursuant to this 
Agreement (other than by virtue of any 
default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit 
shall be returned to Buyer. 
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contractual provision. Norman v. Recreation Centers of Sun 
Citv. Inc. , 156 Ariz. 425, 752 P. 2d 514, 517 (Ariz. App. 1988). 
Accordingly, the provisions of Paragraph N would apply only to 
situations not specifically addressed by Paragraphs G and H. 
II. KELLEY' S FAILURE TO MAKE AN UNCONDITIONAL TENDER OF 
PERFORMANCE PRECLUDES SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
A. An Unconditional Tender Is Required As A 
Condition Precedent To A Decree Of Specific 
Performance. 
On several occasions, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that a complete and unconditional tender is a prerequisite to an 
action for specific performance. In Baxter v. Camelot 
Properties, Inc. , 622 P. 2d 808 (Utah 1981), for example, a 
purchaser brought an action for specific performance of a 
purchase agreement involving two condominium units entered into 
between the parties in May, 1977. The terms of the initial 
purchase agreement were that the buyer was to make a cash down 
payment of 10 percent and to obtain a mortgage loan for the 
remaining 90 percent. 622 P. 2d 809. The date of the closing 
was left open. In October, 1978, the seller requested that the 
purchaser complete the purchase within the next ten days by 
depositing the 10 percent down payment and making application 
for the 90 percent loan. Plaintiff did not comply with this 
letter, but proposed several alternative offers, none of which 
was accepted by the defendant. Id. 
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Thereafter, the plaintiff made two "tenders of 
performance. •• In January, 1979, the plaintiff tendered the 10 
percent down payment but did not state whether she had made 
application for the loan for the additional 90 percent; 
defendant did not respond to this tender. IJ£. In February, 
1979, plaintiff tendered more money for the two units and 
required seller to carry a contract for 90 percent of the sales 
price; defendant did not respond to this tender. 622 P. 2d 810. 
Thereafter, plaintiff brought an action for specific performance 
of the original agreement. The Court held that the plaintiff 
did not tender the performance required by the terms of the 
agreement and, accordingly, specific performance was denied. 
622 P. 2d at 811. 
The following year, the Utah Supreme Court explained 
why a conditional tender, that is one not in conformance with 
the terms of the agreement, is inadequate as a matter of law for 
purposes of bringing an action to compel performance: 
[With respect to] a contract . . . which 
contemplates simultaneous performance by 
both parties, such as the Earnest Money 
agreement involved in this case, neither 
party can be said to be in default (and thus 
susceptible to a judgment for damages or a 
decree for specific performance) until the 
other party has tendered his own 
performance . . . . In other words, the 
party who desires to use legal process to 
exercise his legal remedies under such a 
contract must make a tender of his own 
agreed performance in order to put the other 
party in default. . . . To qualify under 
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this rule, a tender, such as an offer to pav 
money, must be complete and unconditional. 
C^ntyry 31 Alj. Wggt?rp fiefrl Egtfrt? ft Ipv, , JflCr Vt Wefrfr, 645 
P. 2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
gee frlgp Zion's Properties. Inc. v. Holt. 538 P. 2d 1319 (Utah 
1975) (a tender requires that there be a bona fide, 
unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of money due, 
coupled with an actual production of the money or its 
equivalent); Fischer v. Johnson. 525 P. 2d 45 (Utah 1974) (to 
claim specific performance, a party must either perform or 
tender performance in accordance with the covenants in the 
contract.) 
B. Kelley's Tender Was Not Unconditional And He 
Is Therefore Precluded From A Decree Of 
Specific Performance. 
In this case, Kelley's "tender" was not in accordance 
with the terms of the Agreement, because it was conditioned on 
First Security undertaking obligations that were not required by 
the Agreement. The Agreement clearly provided the options 
available in the event the title to the property was 
unmarketable: Where the defects in title were not curable 
through an escrow agreement at closing (e. g. , paying money to 
release liens or other encumbrances), the purchaser could either 
waive the defects and close the sale, or his earnest money 
deposit would be returned and the Agreement declared null and 
void. (R. 15; Appendix 2, WIG and H) Similarly, the options 
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available to the purchaser in the event of property damage 
caused by vandalism were provided by the Agreement: If the 
seller agrees to repair or replace the damaged property the 
buyer may, at his option, either proceed to closing or declare 
the Agreement null and void. (R. 17; Appendix 2 HP) 
In this case, Kelley' s tender was expressly 
conditioned on First Security resolving the boundary dispute, 
clearing title, and resolving the water rights problem, even 
though Kelley had knowledge that substantial litigation was 
required to do so. (R.120) Clearly, such a tender was not made 
in accordance with the provisions in the Agreement; rather, it 
was conditioned on First Security undertaking obligations not 
provided for in the Agreement and over which First Security had 
no control. 
By this Agreement, the parties stipulated to what the 
remedy would be in case of the failure or inability of First 
Security to provide merchantable title. Such a stipulation is 
binding, at least in the absence of fault or bad faith by the 
vendor. Supra, at p. 14. First Security clearly contemplated 
limiting its obligation to cure defects to title -- both before 
closing, as demonstrated by Paragraphs G and H of the Agreement, 
and after closing, as demonstrated by its inserting in the 
Agreement the "as is" and "without warranty" and "title conveyed 
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by special warranty deed" language. 10 By annexing an 
unwarranted condition to his tender of performance, Kelley in 
effect refused to perform. See Gerritsen v. Dranev, 351 P. 2d 
667, 673 (Wyo. 1960) (a tender made not in conformity with the 
contract is the same as if no tender is made at all); Johnson v. 
Goldberg, 130 Cal.App. 2d 571, 279 P. 2d 131 (1955) (conditional 
tender of performance is a refusal to perform). 
The parties also, by their Agreement, stipulated to 
the remedy in the event of property damage caused by vandalism. 
First Security had no obligation to repair or replace the 
damaged property. Rather, the Agreement provided that if First 
Security agreed to repair the damage, then Kelley could proceed 
with the Agreement. However where, as in this case, the First 
Security*did not agree to repair the damaged property, the only 
obligation First Security had was to allow for the termination 
of the Agreement by its terms, unless Kelley waived any claim 
for the property damage. Again, Kelley' s tender of performance 
was not in conformance with the Agreement and, therefore, in 
effect was a refusal to perform. Gerritsen, 351 P. 2d at 673; 
Johnson, 279 P. 2d at 131. 
10
 As to the definition of a "special warranty deed," and 
the limited liabilities of the seller, see 6A R. Powell, The Law 
of Real Property, fl 900[2](d), 81A-141 (1990). Also see. 
Central Life Assurance Soc. v. Impelmans, 13 Wash. 2d 632, 126 
P. 2d 757, 763 (1942). 
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First Security, as a matter of law, was not obligated 
to accept Kelley' s tender of performance requiring First 
Security to provide a remedy and undertake obligations not 
required by the Agreement. In turn, Kelley' s conditional 
tender, as a matter of law, was deficient and therefore an 
insufficient basis to enable Kelley to bring an action in 
specific performance. 
Kelley argues that his tender of performance, 
evidenced by the September 22, 1987 letter (Appendix 5), was not 
defective because the only condition that the letter imposed was 
that "First Security honor[] its obligation pursuant to the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and deliver[] the property free 
from those defects which it has undertaken to cure." (Kelley 
Brief, pp. 21-22) Kelley argues that a tender conditioned on 
the other party performing its obligations under an agreement 
does not render the tender defective. 
Kelley' s argument begs the question. The issue is 
whether or not Kelley had the right to insist that First 
Security deliver title to the property free from the defects it 
undertook to cure. Clearly, First Security did not have that 
obligation. The Agreement set forth the obligations, rights and 
options of the parties in the event of a title defect or 
property damage. As noted above, those contractual provisions 
are binding. (Supra at p. 14) Accordingly, Kelley's demand 
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that First Security deliver unencumbered title and repair the 
property damage was contrary to the Agreement, and imposed 
conditions not authorized by the Agreement. 
Kelley also argues that he and First Security had a 
difference of opinion concerning First Security's duty to clear 
title, which was why the lawsuit was filed and claims that the 
September 22 letter was merely to set forth Kelley' s 
understanding of First Security' s obligations. Regardless of 
how Kelley characterizes the September 22 letter, it 
specifically states it is a tender and that the tender was 
specifically conditioned on First Security resolving the title 
defects, resolving the water rights issues and repairing or 
replacing the damaged property. (Appendix 5) These obligations 
were not assumed by First Security under the Agreement, and 
Kelley' s attempt to impose these obligations on First Security 
in his tender caused the tender to be defective. 
III. KELLEY WAS NOT EXCUSED FROM TENDERING HIS OWN PERFORMANCE. 
Kelley was required to tender his own performance if 
he desired to enforce the Agreement, and the tender had to be 
complete and unconditional. Century 21 All Western Real Estate 
& Inv. . Inc. v. Webb, 645 P. 2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982). Kelley now 
argues that his tender was excused, and that he can therefore 
still seek to enforce the Agreement. 
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It is first noted that once the title defects became 
known, the Agreement required that Kelley either waive the 
defects and proceed with the Agreement, or accept a refund of 
his deposit and permit the Agreement to terminate. He was 
required by the Agreement to make an election. Even assuming 
for purposes of argument that Kelley' s tender was excused, he 
was still required to make an election. His election, as 
evidenced by the September 22 letter, was to refuse to waive the 
title defects and claim for property damage. Accordingly, the 
Agreement terminated by its own terms. u 
Kelley argues that he was excused from making his own 
tender because First Security' s tender, as evidenced by its 
September 4 letter (Appendix 3), was defective. Kelley claims 
that in its September 4 letter First Security repudiated its 
obligations to convey marketable title, and that this excused 
Kelley's own tender. It is not First Security who is now 
seeking to enforce the Agreement. Kelley is. Therefore whether 
First Security made a tender or even a defective tender is 
irrelevant. The party seeking to enforce an agreement must make 
11
 See the discussion in Argument IV, commencing infra at 
page 29 regarding the time of the essence provision in the 
Agreement and the fact that had Kelley failed to make any 
election or tender by September 22, 1987, the Agreement would 
have terminated in any event. 
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Kelley relies on Lanaston v, Huffacker, 36 Wash. App. 
779, 678 P.2d 1265 (1984) to support his argument that First 
Security was required to exercise diligence. In that case, the 
real estate contract contained a termination provision similar 
to that found in Paragraphs G and H of the Agreement and had a 
"time of the essence" provision. The seller argued that the 
contract was terminated because the buyer failed to tender 
performance by the closing date. The court stated that the 
seller had a duty to clear title, if it could be done with 
reasonable diligence and prior to the closing date. 678 P. 2d at 
1271. In the Lanaston case, the title defect was easily 
curable, and could have been cured by the closing date, if the 
seller had exercised diligence. The court essentially concluded 
that failure to cure the defect was bad faith, which precluded 
the seller from terminating the agreement based on the time of 
the essence provision. The court held that the bad faith of the 
seller excused the buyer' s obligation to make a tender by the 
closing date. However, in this matter, there is not any 
evidence or even an argument that First Security was acting in 
bad faith or failed to exercise diligence to clear title by the 
closing date. 
In fact, First Security did exercise reasonable 
diligence to clear title, but was unable to do so by the closing 
date of August 31 (Appendix 2) or the closing "date of 
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Kelley argues at length concerning the meaning of the 
provision in the Agreement that states: 
Property sold ' as is' without warranty. 
Title conveyed by Special Warranty Deed 
corp. form. Other terms to remain the same. 
Kelley insists that First Security is relying on that provision 
to relieve it of its obligation to convey marketable title. 
(Kelley Brief, pp. 26-29) Regardless of the meaning of the 
provision, the Agreement sets forth the remedies and options 
available to Kelley in the event First Security is unable to 
convey marketable title. (Appendix 2, HHG an^ H) First 
Security's letter of September 4 does not repudiate those 
remedies and options. It merely states: 
First Security is prepared to sell the 
property to you "' as is' without warranty" 
in accordance with the terms of the earnest 
money agreement. 
As noted above, the Agreement recites that the "[pjroperty sold 
' as is' without warranty. '• Nothing in the letter contradicts 
the provisions of the Agreement. Accordingly, First Security 
did not repudiate its obligations, and Kelley was not excused 
from making an unconditional tender of performance. 
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IV. 'WHERE TIME IS THE ESSENCE OF THE AGREEMENT FAILURE TO 
TENDER BY THE CLOSING DATE PRECLUDES SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
A. The Agreement Terminated Bj Its Own Terms 
Because Of The Ti me Of The Essence Clause. 
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s p e c i f - . , p e i fu r i . i an je - s a - t , . - e ± ± e : - , - u a n t 
t ' ~n r ' : r n f ' p r m. r,pv r ^ ^ p r* and *--* v - -. rcha?- agreem^^t 
s 
s i g r . e . < - r . * : i o s . : , i, : * o u y e i . : . e -a rn t ' : : ^ a 
e n C U m b r a ^ ~ ^ * ^r*r>r>o v~t~ * 'Tin w r - . - C T C * + O ^ + * - O J * ' 5 
e e 
terms : A ' * . : , * . jemano <- buyer' s 
right. 645 P 2d at 55. The parties had agreed i ipon a • zl • :>si ng 
d a t e c £ De c e mbe i: 2 2:; ne :i 1: h< =J r p a i !:  y 111 a d e d t e nd e i o 1 1.1 e r t o r m a nc e 
on or before that date, 645 P. 2d at, ? I However, on Jan-ar;. 9, 
1979 the buyer advised th€ sel; ] = .r I hi , wo i t- "  i t ,ni ,> i INN I r 
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to close on this transaction" provided the seller cleared the 
encumbrance. 645 P. 2d at 54-55. 
The court noted that the tender was, in that 
situation, made within the contract period; the court reasoned 
that in cases where the executory contract contains no 
declaration that time is of the essence, the contract 
obligations can continue for some time beyond the stated closing 
date. However, the court made clear this holding was limited to 
situations in which there is no time of essence agreement 
between the parties: 
Where the contract states that time is of 
the essence, cases hold that both parties 
are discharged from their contract 
obligations if neither makes tender by the 
agreed closing date. 
Century 21, 645 P. 2d at 55 n. 1 (citations omitted). 
Significantly, the court found that even though made while the 
contract was still in effect (due to the lack of a time of 
essence clause), the tender was insufficient as a matter of law 
because it was conditional on a term not found in the agreement 
and declined to order specific performance. 645 P. 2d at 56. 
The Court' s notation that time of the essence clauses 
are to be strictly enforced is in accord with holdings of other 
courts. E. q. , Nix v. Clarv, 640 P. 2d 246 (Colo. App. 1981) 
(purchasers were not entitled to specific performance as they 
failed to tender payment as required by the contract which 
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Even assuming that despite the time of essence clause, 
the Agreement remained open, Kelley never attempted to tender 
unconditional performance of the Agreement after the last 
extension had expired. Indeed, First Security offered to allow 
closing on October 8, 1987, if Kelley would make an 
unconditional tender of performance. (R. 296) Again, however, 
Kelley refused, stating that First Security was obligated to 
provide a remedy to the title and property damage disputes not 
provided for in the Agreement. (R. 297) 
In fact, when Kelley filed this action on 
September 22, 1987, he requested an order of the Court that 
First Security was obligated to resolve the boundary dispute, 
rectify the property damage and then convey the property to 
Kelley -- which prayer is consistent with the position Kelley 
had assumed in refusing to go forward with the closing. (R. 7) 
At some point, first reflected in the pleadings on November 25, 
1987, Kelley' s position changed. In the memorandum in support 
of Kelley's motion for summary judgment (R. 140-274), Kelley 
requests the court to order First Security to convey "whatever 
title it has" to the Subject Property. (R. 181) Even then, 
Kelley sought damages in the form of abatement of the purchase 
price -- a remedy not bargained for in the Agreement. 
Moreover, by the time Kelley changed his position to 
seek conveyance of "whatever title [First Security] has," the 
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essence provision of the Agreement by the extensions of the 
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 It is also noted, uei. 
performance of a real estate -
that a proper t< "er was made 
Rued v, Alvey,, ~ * " "" -
he purchaser must show 
ommencement of the suit. 
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closing date, and cites to Centyry Z\ hll *fegterr> frgfll Egtate fr 
Inv. . Inc. v. Webb. 645 P. 2d 52, 55 (Utah 1982). The court in 
the Century 21 case did state that where an executory contract 
does not contain a time of the essence provision, the contract 
obligation can continue beyond the closing date. However, there 
was no discussion in that case concerning waiver of such a 
provision. 13 In this case, the Agreement contains a time of 
the essence provision and it was not waived by the extensions of 
the closing dates. 
Contrary to the position of Kelley, the extensions of 
the closing date to a date certain did not have the effect of 
waiving the time of the essence provision. In fact, an 
extension of a closing to a date certain has the effect of 
making ti i..e of the essence as to the closing date. Moore v. 
Lovelace, 413 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 1982). Also see. Bishop v. 
Tolbert, 249 S. C. 289, 153 S. E. 2d 912, 918 (1967) In the case 
of Hart v. Lvons, 106 111. App. 3d 803, 436 N. E. 2d 723 (111. App. 
13
 Kelley relies on Tanner v. Baadscraard, 612 P. 2d 345 
(Utah 1980), Sohaveah v. Oberlander, 155 A. D. 2d 436, 547 
N. Y. S. 2d 98 (1989), and Cline v. Hullum. 435 P. 2d 152 (Okla. 
1967) for the proposition that a party must be given a 
reasonable time within which to perform before the other party 
can make time of the essence once waived or if the agreement 
does not contain such a provision. Those cases are not 
pertinent because the subject Agreement contained a time of the 
essence provision which was not waived, as discussed in the text 
infra. In any event, as to what constitutes a reasonable length 
of time, see generally 32 ALR 4th Vendor' s Notice - Time of 
Performance §§ 6-8 (1984). 
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provided that time was of the essence. (R. 17 11 Q) Indeed, the 
Agreement expressly states that the time of essence provision 
relates "only to extensions of the closing date." 
(R. 17 1F Q) With respect to the extensions, the time of essence 
provision was annexed to the extensions ending on June 1, 1987, 
on July 1, 1987, and on August 31, 1987, as 
each of these extensions was written on a form addendum which 
provided that "all other terms of the Agreement shall remain the 
same." (R. 19-21) (Appendix 2) 
The extension made by letters dated September 4, 1987 
(R. 114) and September 14, 1987 (R. 116) (Appendices 3 and 4, 
respectively), extending the time for performance to 
September 22, 1987, each provided clear notice that if Kelley 
failed to perform by September 22, 1987, his right to purchase 
the property under the Agreement would terminate. Any question 
of First Security' s intentions to adhere strictly to the time 
for performance was dispelled by its letter dated September 14, 
1987 (R. 17-18) (Appendix 4), which unequivocally stated that if 
Kelley failed to tender performance the Agreement would be 
considered null and void. See Boehnlein v. Ansco. Inc. , 61 
Or. App. 389, 657 P. 2d 702, petition denied, 294 Ore. 682, 662 
P. 2d 725 (1983); Wfrghytng Realty » Development gpT yT Hgygllyn 
Holding Corp. . 96 N.J. 498, 126 A. 326 (1924). 
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When an issue resolved on appeal disposes of the 
entire action, as in this case, the appellate court should 
property direct the lower court to enter judgment accordingly. 
This is true even if the appeal is from a summary judgment. 
Pioneer Finance & Thrift Co. v. Powell. 21 Wash. 2d 201, 443 P. 2d 
389 (1968); Leithead v. American Colloid Co. , 721 P. 2d 1059, 
1063-64 (Wyo. 1986); Harlow v. Carleson. 16 Cal. 3d 731, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 298, 548 P. 2d 698, 703 (1976). 
Kelley argues that there were three factual issues 
which precluded the Court of Appeals from directing that 
judgment be entered. Those included whether or not (i) Kelley 
refused to waive the title defects, (ii) title was insurable, 
and (iii) the title defects could have been cured through an 
escrow agreement. As to the title defects, as discussed above, 
there is no question that Kelley refused to waive the defects. 
Kelley, in fact, insisted in the September 22 letter and his 
Complaint that First Security remedy the title defects and the 
property damage. For Kelley to argue to the contrary is 
disingenuous. 
The title was not insurable, and there is no factual 
issue in that regard. Kelley' s present position that title may 
have been insurable without exceptions for defects is somewhat 
astounding. In both his tender of performance, evidenced by the 
letter dated September 22, 1988, and in his Brief, Kelley claims 
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has been suggested that the defects could have been cured by 
reducing the purchase price and depositing the amount of the 
reduction in escrow. Such an escrow does not "cure" the 
defects. Escrow agreements generally are used to "satisfy" 
unreleased liens or similar encumbrances. The escrow itself 
makes the title marketable. E. a. , Webb v. Consolidated Oil Co. . 
100 F. 2d 865 (5th Cir. 1939); Holmbv, Inc. v. Pino. 98 Nev. 358, 
647 P. 2d 392 (1982); Rankin v. McFerrin, 626 P. 2d 720 (Colo. 
App. 1980); fipfreson-Mflripn p$v$lppm$nt Cpy Vr Powers QQ., 256 
S. C. 583, 183 S. E. 2d 454 (1971). In this case, the escrow 
cannot make the title to the Property marketable because the 
boundary problem would still exist. 
Kelley's argument that title was insurable under 
Paragraph H or could be cured by an escrow also ignores the fact 
that in the September 22, 1988 letter, Kelley refused to close 
the transaction until the boundary dispute was "resolved." 
(R. 61; Appendix 5) If the boundary dispute was in fact not a 
title defect to which Kelley could complain under Paragraph H, 
or could have been cured through an escrow, then his demand that 
First Security resolve the dispute further supports the argument 
that his tender of performance was defective. The argument 
further ignores the fact that in the September 22 letter Kelley 
also demanded that First Security resolve the water rights 
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is incapable of being specifically enforced. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 7 - day of February, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow 
Kathryn H. Snedaker 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Respondent* 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
(Ori gi nal Si gnature) 
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APPENDIX 1 
Court of Appeals Opinion, issued January 5, 1990 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
William R. Kelley, Jr., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Leucadia Financial Corporation, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F I L E D 
^ .JAN-,51990 
" O t i l f k of tw Court 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880534-CA 
Third District Court, Summit County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: John A. Snow and Kathryn H. Snedaker, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
David R. Olsen, Charles P. Sampson, and Claudia F, 
Berry, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Leucadia Financial Corporation (Leucadia)1 appeals a 
summary judgment decree of specific performance requiring it to 
convey real property to respondent (Kelley) pursuant to a sales 
agreement. The lower court reserved Kelley*s damages as an 
issue to be tried, but the parties settled that issue out of 
court prior to the appeal. We reverse. 
The issues we must decide are (1) whether the parties' 
sales agreement provides remedies to Kelley if Leucadia is 
unable to convey marketable title, and (2) whether those 
remedies require conveyance by Leucadia if title is not 
marketable. 
1. During the proceedings below, Leucadia succeeded to the 
interest of the original seller, First Security Mortgage 
Company. For simplicity, we will refer to Leucadia as the 
seller. 
The property contemplated by the parties in their sales 
agreement was not surveyed until after the parties executed 
that agreement. The survey revealed that Leucadiafs property 
description did not include certain acreage containing a 
stream, a pond, and a spring, all of which the parties had 
believed to be part of their agreement. Leucadia was unable to 
resolve the land description problem by negotiating with the 
adjoining property owner. Thereafter, Leucadia initiated 
litigation against the adjoining owner and then decided it was 
not worth prosecuting. While Leucadia was trying to clear 
title to the disputed land and water rights, the parties in the 
instant action extended their closing date. Later, each of the 
parties maneuvered to obtain remedies which each believed to 
flow from their contract. 
Leucadia offered to convey title subject to the defects 
or to return Kelleyfs earnest money deposit. Kelley tendered a 
portion of the agreed purchase price and insisted that Leucadia 
clear title and then convey the property. Simultaneously, 
Kelley filed suit for (1) a declaratory judgment of the 
parties' rights under the terms of the contract, and (2) 
specific performance pursuant to the contract terms, as 
declared. 
The lower court implicitly interpreted the contract as 
not providing an agreed remedy in the event Leucadia could not 
convey cleat and marketable title to all the property. 
Judgment was entered for an equitable remedy, i.e., specific 
performance, with an abatement of the purchase price to 
follow. Thus, the lower court interpreted the parties1 
agreement as a matter of law, not determined by extrinsic 
evidence of intent. We accord that construction no particular 
weight and review the determination under a correctness 
standard. £££ Kimball V, Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is also a 
question of law. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 
(Utah 1983). We find, as a matter of law, no ambiguity in the 
agreement concerning the rights and remedies of the parties in 
the event title was found to be defective and unmarketable. 
A cardinal principle of contract law is that, in the 
absence of fraud or mutual mistake, a clear and unambiguous 
contract must be enforced according to its terms. Fast v. 
Kalian, 206 Kan. 682, 481 P.2d 958, 961 (1971). The terms of 
the contract, where clear and unambiguous, are conclusive. 
Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co., 101 Ariz. 470, 421 P.2d 318, 320 
(1966). The first source of inquiry is the written document 
itself- Bio Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv 
Corp., 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Thus, we turn 
to the terms to which these parties agreed. 
Leucadia agreed "to furnish good and marketable title to 
the property," subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted in 
the contract. Paragraph G (Title Inspection) of the agreement 
provided a title inspection procedure prior to closing, 
including how the parties would deal with any title defect that 
appeared: "If said defect is not curable through an escrow 
agreement at closing, this agreement shall be null and void at 
the option of the buyer, and all monies received herewith shall 
be returned to the respective parties." Kelley refused to 
accept this option. The parties agreed that title insurance 
would be utilized for closing. Paragraph 4 (Title Insurance) 
of the agreement provided the procedure for insuring title: 
"If title cannot be made insurable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to 
waive such defects and encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and 
this agreement shall thereupon be terminated." Title could not 
be made insurable without exceptions for defects. Kelley 
refused to waive the defects, thus his remedy, as agreed; was 
limited to a refund of his earnest money deposit, not specific 
performance. 
We have examined the other issues argued by the parties, 
including that of tender,2 and conclude they are meritless or 
that they do not require our consideration in light of the 
clear and unambiguous terms of the parties1 agreement.3 
2. This court recently discussed the requirement of tender, 
where a purchase agreement contemplates simultaneous 
performance by the parties, in Bell v. Elder. 121 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 16 (Ct. App. 1989), and Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 89 (Ct. App. 1989). Sfifi aJj&£L Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-1 (1987). 
3. In its brief, Leucadia touched on a related issue of 
vandalism, believed to have been committed by the adjoining 
landowner, which diverted the water and dried up the pond. 
Paragraph P (Risk of Loss) of the parties' agreement provided a 
procedure for dealing with loss or damage to the property prior 
to closing. Kelley did not seek to use that procedure. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case 
is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
The main opinion reverses this judgment because there is 
no contractual provision allowing for specific performance. If 
Kelley made a proper and timely tender of payment, I believe 
the remedy of specific performance is available. 
My colleagues are correct in limiting the parties' 
remedies at law to the terms of the contract. If there was a 
-defect- in Leucadia's title, the contract permits Kelley to: 
1) waive the defect and go through with the purchase; or 2) 
take a refund of his earnest money. In this case, Leucadia 
agreed to sell property located at a specific address in Summit 
County. Leucadia had good and marketable title to property 
located at that address. Leucadia erroneously believed and 
represented that the property contained a neighboring stream, 
pond, and spring. That fact should not cloud title to the 
property Leucadia actually owned. There is, therefore, no 
-defect- in Leucadiafs title. Sfifi Blackfs Law Dictionary 1332 
(5th ed. 1979) (defective title means unmarketable title). 
Clearly, where the contract has not provided a legal remedy, 
the trial court could order specific performance of the 
contract. 
Even where a legal remedy is provided, however, the trial 
court has the discretion to order specific performance of the 
contract if the legal remedy is inadequate. See generally 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357-360 (1981). -The rule 
o o nno A _r»A 4 
has been long established that a vendee has the right to insist 
upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able 
to perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the 
value of the deficiency or defect." Castaono v. Church. 552 
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976); £fifi alfifi. In re Havhurst's Estate. 
478 P.2d 343 (Okla. 1970); Streator v. White, 26 Wash. App. 
430, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). 
I believe the trial court had the discretion to order 
Leucadia to convey the property it owned with an abatement in 
the purchase price. Resolution of this appeal should turn not 
on the unavailability of specific performance as a remedy, but 
on whether Kelley made a proper and timely tender, as argued by 
the parties. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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APPENDIX 2 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
tAKIMt 7 MONEY SALES AGR[ MENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (0) 
This is s legally binding contract. Read tha antira documant carefully before signing. 
EEL 
REALTOR® 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property: plumbing, 
sting, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies 
J rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automate garage door 
mer and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by 
son of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income 
efrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in as is" condition subject to Seller s warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires 
f additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which 
i not or will not be rwr\%6\9(i prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances 
my nature shall be brought current on or before dosing; and (c) the plumbing, heeting. air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances 
ill be sound or irt satisfactory working condition at closing. 
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any pnvate well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers knowledge, provided an adequate supply of 
rer and continued use of the weJI or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is. to the best of Seller s knowledge, in good working order and 
ier has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets ail applicable government health and construction standards. 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing. 
Ier shall provide to Buyer wntten verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the 
isent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in me 
•nt of sale, if any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after nonce of 
iwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written no tee 
Seller or Seller's agent. In such case, ail earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions 
said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void. 
G. TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Aqreement. but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, Buver 
ill have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion, or a preliminary title report on the subject properry. 
rer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept. Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Seller 
Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter. Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure me 
ect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option 
he Buyer, and ail monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Usting Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALTA 
fey of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than 
se provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through 
escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement 
II thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge. 
/ 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) davs 
r Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting 
property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent within three (3) working days thereafter. Buyer shall take title subject to sucft 
es. if objection ts not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
i. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this AgUfe ie t l teller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor 
•nd Ten*) mo^uj 
DATE. ^ S r g g ^ y *o /9*srr\*-V*&F 
T 
The-undersigned Buyer.. 
ERNEST MONEY_th» amount of -£fcaa * Z 3 ^ • " •"-» - *J 
the form.of /£*£~~*»-S A1,^-^ G l~oS**^ kJ r> • * ~ i «rtuch snaU b« dipoufed m accpfdjn 
tang. < # > / - < ; * , 9 - « 3 V > " " " " • * " * • ' " ^ - ^ ^ ^ - < ^ 
hereby deposits with Brokerage 
. M l i r i l l ^ S S . 
dance with applicable-Stat* Law 
T T T 
OFFER TO PURCHASE :GM4 
1 PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY ts^ fliven to secure and apply on the purchase of the. property situated a 
32.Q Uter 
^County of ^L">f <** '** 
*so^,£ J-S'^Z' 
. m the City Utah 
leer to any restnctiv* covenants- zoning regulations otHity or other easements, or rights of way, government patents or state 6mdx of record approved by Buyer" 
ccordance with: Section G Said* property- is more- particularly described ar * ~ 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
P UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Vacant Lot D Vacant Acreage D Other 
0 IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Commercial % Residential OCondo Q Other . 
(a) Included item*. Unless excluded below, this sale shall inckid* ail fixtures and any of the items shown in Sect)on A if presently attached to the p/operry. 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title *£*•> flf££f*£* 
(b\ Excluded item*. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale s4S£?**'£ 
(c) CONNECTIONS. UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Setter represents that the property indudes the following improvements in the purchase price-
2* public sewer ^J** connected 
Jjseptic tank ^{connected 
£1 other sanitary system 
JjEouhhc water <£connected 
<5vPn ***& water ^connected 
Jewell ^connected Dother 
CC irrigation water/secondary system 
#• of shares _ _ ^ Company*. 
(0 TV antenna- Qmaster antenna Q prewired 
^finatu/ai gas j^Siconnected 
JSleJectncity ^connected 
^ingress & egress by private easement 
^^Ddedicated road ^ 0 paved ' 
(Ocurb and gutte* 
db other rights 
> prior to dosing,^ shalK not "be- furnished-(d) Survey A certified survey Sshall be fiirm«K»»»Twtff>r»"inn9re» n < i i $ , V . ^ 5 > z 
(e) Buyec Inspection- Buyer has made a visual inspection of the- property apd subject to Section t (c) above and frbelow accepts it in its presem? phys*cai 
condition except -___^_-«_-__—«_-_--«_«^_—__-^-_^___—--_-_---_-____-«-_^ 
2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING; The total purchase pnce for the property 
m=rOo(lars 
,«^<£l^ /v4^^z^^^7%^^<f^—A 
72S 
us2L 
JZL 
&o aoo ~ ,) which shall be paid as follows 
which represents the aforedescnbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at dosing 
tepresenung the approximate- balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to- be assumed 
by buyer which obligation bears interest at _ _ _ . % per annum with monthly payments of % _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
which include D principal O interest D taxes D insurance* Dcondo fees. nmh«r 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be-
assumed by Buyer which obligation bears interest at - %- oe* annum with monthly payments ot $ -
which include. J3principair -OJnterest. Otaxesj. Diosurancej* Qcondo fees; Dother ~ 
representing balance if any, including proceeds from a new. . loan to be paid as, follows.. 
" < & * & Q^~; 
T 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE f+rze. ^^J<^ * ' r ' " f J? **y*~+ 7 * * - ^ = f e € £+**,**>< 
me and *>is If Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procure sa   
r is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees to make application within. 
s after SeHer s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation anoVor obtain the new financing at an mteres rate not to exceed *fe. 
uyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing «/ithm / Sf days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement mis Agreement shall bevoidaoie 
ie option of the Buyer or SeUet-upon written notice H j Q \ 
Seller agrees to pay i , / ^ / T towards Buyer s total financing and closing costs including but not limited to loac\ discount points. 
IHhrs. Agreement involves the assumption of an existing loan or obligation- on the property. Section F shall apply 
ropvrrr^avufwi iw vnvumuiwua* •*»- »M«vuwn> <r M»-I-HH wfovnooo wy^ ki • currem policy of use m ^cs in the amount of purchase pnce£}an abexrac 
4 ugrftBrought current with an attorney s opinion (Sv .ection H) •» 
4 INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G. Buyer shaft have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subiect property pnor to dosing 
uvef shall take title subject to any existing restncave covenants, mdudiog condominium restnctions (CC & R's) Buyer Q has W has not reviewed-any condc 
unnim CC & R s prior to signing this Agreement r^ 
. 5. -VESTING OF TITLE. _ Title shall vest in Buyer aa fellows, A.S* P'&?£Tr& S Dsfv* f&Qg. r& ^ ^SV^^. 
6 SELLER WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C the following items are also warranted 
m i i — — — — — — — — » . — — — — — ~ — » — — — -
Lceptions to the above and Section C shall 5e limited to the following. 
y - 4 * * ! , 
T. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS ANQ CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which- mus 
satisfied pnor to dosing V _ S t^_I^ 
^TV^ 
6& PAY* F£*+t *ec-£*7*<~az gy &CZ<L£& r 
8 CLOSING OF SALE This Agreement "shall be closed on or before —• '^—mr—— a reasonable location to be. designated b> 
Iler. subiect to Section Q Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Qosing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance 
th this Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R. shall be made as of j$ data of possession J^date of dosing^ other • •• > 
9 POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on dl + ^ f*~ _T unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
10 GENERAL PROVISIONS. Unless* otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Section* on the reverse side hereof are incorporated mta thri 
reement by reference . _ -
11 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME UMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller 
ill have until it<*w _ to accept this offer Unless accepted this offer shall lapse and the .Agent shall return the 
7SXEB&* t^Z^^l17 -=-! Buyer Date 
ECKONE * 
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the-foregoing offer on the term* and conditions specified above 
REJECTION Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer - .'(uellM l IMHMUJ) "" 
COUNTER-OFFER Seller hereby accepts the foregowg offer*SUBdECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the, attached Addendum, and 
>reseots said. COUNTER OFFER to Buyer s- acceptance Buyer she* have* until S&S* l (A M TflvT) _?r<a? 19 4-2— to accept the. term* 
pecified below J\-*,-- t_2- / f t ' /O / J J *> " 
,e 7. J J /jgl^n 4 y <^L^> C -L^f 
Signature of Seller ¥ Signature of Seller 
ECK ONE. 
Juyer accepts the counter offer 
Juyer accepts with modifications 
te ^ u i u ^ - 1 ^ 7 
ne t<*' ,3 O (AM-PM) "Signatureof-Buyer- - ' yS/ Signature of Buyer 
s on attached addendum A \ } „ fl fj 
Signature of-Buyer* - S/ 
(^Brokerage} 
• — r^. ' ' ' ; ' ' = 
COMMISSION^ The undersigned hereby agrees to paytp ^ -^^y^ <r / t y ^ *
 = * 
ommission of r~* <* * ^ ^s*' ** * *^ * *—' as consideration for the efforts in procunng a buyer 
• > ^ y r ^ ^ - ^ ^ - ______i7 
nature of Setfer I _ tOate Signature of Seller Date 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law require* Broker to furnrsh Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore 
:om piaxed) 
A J2$, acknowledge receipt of a finat copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures Si 
NATURE OF SELLER S\GHAW*Z OF BUYER? ; - / / / / A , 
Date " " JS Date -z ~ -^ ^  
Date f\ 4 n r Date 
B Of personalry caused a. final copy "of the foregoing Agreement beering all signatures to be mailed on __: - - . 19 by 
if led Mail and return recetot attached hereto to. the QSeflar n Rir^r c_»t Ku 
C. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person exv*,. 
ilf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
- COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and supersedes and 
els any and all pnor negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no verbal agreements when modify 
ffect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
1 COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be m writing end. if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of tha 
tement not expressly modified or excluded therein^ 
I DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated 
ages or to institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by SeHer. or if this sale fails to dose because of the nonsatisfactjon of any 
ess condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposrt 
! be returned to Buyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall 
all costs end expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from en for a ng or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any 
>dy provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the pnnopal broker holding the earnest 
ey deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resoiva a disputa over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller 
orize the pnnapal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount 
j posit remaining after ad vena ng those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting 
t shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the pnnopal broker in banging such action 
) ABROGATION. Execution of a final real estate contract, if any. shall abrogate this Agreement 
' RISK OF LOSS. All nsk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property 
reen the date hereof and the date of dosing, by reeson of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repeir such damage shall exceed 
percent (10%) of the purchase pnee of the property. Buyer may, at his opton either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or 
ice damaged property pnor to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase once* 
Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property pnor to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
1 T IME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport 
es. fire flood extreme weather governmental regulations, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the dosing date shail 
xtended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the dosing date provided herein. Thereafter, 
is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of dosing date 'Closing" shall mean the date on which all necassary instruments are signed 
delivered by all parties to the transaction 
\ CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half 0 / 2 ) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs 
roviding title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid Dy Seller Taxes ano assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer. 
s and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Uneerned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves 
I be assigned to Buyer at closing. 
5 REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than 
e excepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller s interest under an existing real estate contract Seller may transfer by either (a) special 
anty deed, containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the 
existing reel estate contract therein 
T AGENCY DISCLOSURE. Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller 
J BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term 'Brokerage ' shail mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
/ DAYS. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term 'days ' shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
>E FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
0186 
h UENDUM/COUNTER OFFE.. * 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADOENOUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes (>0 • COUNTER OFFER ( ) an AODENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the - 3 Q ^ ! 1 day o< F e b r U C i r y 19-fiuT between I j Q i ^ i i n C Q 
ft. K e l l f e y i - X ^ asbuyer(s) and F i r S ^ S f C U ^ H r y Q P n k Dt £ f a h asseHer(s). 
covenng real property described as follows 
aao Wp^K.Snnn',^ Unnp 
SummitCnurr i-y, U-Lnh 
The following terms are hereby incorporated aa part of THE AGREEMENT 
of purchase, pn'frf , upnn (yjahftca-bi 'on flndngprovnl 
by Sf-lf.fr,- on tin T°7c inte nssf <pnl^ p a y m e n t s 
rOunr f f r f y pod b o l n n f f , dU£ ' i f t t u ( f 9 mon ths r rn rn 
Oloss. d - £S£ro iQ, AJQ prg-paym£nt penri(^y -f iy £flr/y 
ftny-ofP o f •Hnte nd.fc. Lnnn-fegiS-bo hf- one, p f r r g n t f t f 
rTlorT-QDgg flrrwmt p lus rE f lu lo r^ los rng ^ofif-s 
3, (Jurrfnfc ctrhfid zurvty m'lH kg- pr~ovtfl£c\ (f)y 5£(l&r 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same J0lSellej><3> Buyer shall have until -5 ' ^ ^ «M* /P M ) 
OOorflh 3 19&Z to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date Februnry 3T, 1367 Signature of {^) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Time «5. Q D (*•*« /P M ) 
—?/ *A-tfrT^A- L ^ L*~ 
ACCEPTANCE COUNTEROFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
{^Q i hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
I ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregcyng SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
Signature f/ Signature Date Time 
i ) i hereby reject the forego^g (initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
ft(j I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
Signature of Buvens) Y Date Signature of Seiiensi 
{ ) I personally caused a fjftal copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19XX by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the {£) SeiteU(i.)C&u^er 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This AOOENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes t ) • COUNTER OFFER £ < ^ a n AOOENOUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the _ .dayof .r~*4M*~') 19 'Jpbetween . 
J^. asbuyer(s) and fl' i VSX S^MUT . ./-J, . J^-fc^ asseiier(s) 
covering real property described as follows
 r 
>rf^w td_Ls±x' -^ ._±:4wJU 
P«ffi c:ty vT^ ._ 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part ol THE AGREEMENT 
C / t i ^ r rJ^FK. / < t . * . L f _is/s-ryj' U . /<• _ _ * * O/^^.K-b' • « - . 
°f^/\ / 1/7. 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller ( ^ B u y e r shall have until ^ - 0 0 (AM P M ) 
to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum snail lapse 
Oate r V* ** " ^ 7 Signature o f ^ ^ S e l l e r ( ) Buyer 
Time 2 <y f [AM-^A} 
ACCEPTANCE COUNTEROFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
(^) i hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on me terms specified above 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT trie focyoymg SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum itfduJtiffl^- W>w- ^i± 
w
 Signiturt /7 Signature // Qlte Time Odte 
( ) 1 hereby reject the foregoing (initials) 
DOCUMENT R6CEIPT 
b() 1 acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
Signature of Buvbfisi J& // ua/e Signature ot Se'/c */ Dare 
i\) 1 personalty causeo a fmarcopv of t*e toregomg bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 by Certified Ma»i and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES ACRKKMfcNT 
Thii ADOENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes ( ) • COUNTER OFFER ( X) «n ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the.? P l h . day of . . F e b r u a r y _ 19-iLZ
 b # t w # # f t Wil l iam 
Kelley as buyeMs) and ? A ? S ^ S e C U r ^ t y _ M t 3 ^ .aiseller(s). 
covering real property described as follows 
3_2T) W. Snows Lane 
Park City, Utah 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT 
Clo SJLn_g date hereby extended to on or before July 1, 1987. 
I /u7T<. 
s (*- i ' / • ' i./j. / 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller fC ) Buyer shall have until 5 ; QQ (KX&'P M ) 
J u n e 1 IQ 8 7 to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
n..» Mav 2 8 , 1987 
Time / * . ' / < / PM ) 
Signature of (X > Seller ( ) Buyer 
ACCEPTANCC COUNTER Of?i* REJECTION 
Check One 
6 M i hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
(/ ) l hereby A G C & P T t h ^ foJf 79,n9 SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
Signature 
{ ) I hereby reject the foreq^ng (initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
S'gnituft of Buytrti) Dstt Stgnstu** of Senem/ . Dae 
(•X^ I personally caused a final copy of the fc*ego«ng bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on — < ^ / / 
19 .521 . by Cerui\pa+fi*\ and retur^ receip^ettacnea hereto to the {yd Seller ( ) Buyer 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Thit AOOENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes ( ) a COUNTER OFFER ^ ^ an AODENOUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the > day o f . between 
.asbuyer(s) .and. — asseiier(s) 
covering real property described as follows ^ 
22o <v. J > ^ ^
 f z ^ A. /w r.,% *.-r 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT 
/ i ' /*M 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller ( ^ Buyer shall have until A M / P M I 
to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date /**€ ~~ & 7 Signature of X Seller ( ) Buyer 
Time ( A M ,'P M.) 
ACCEPTANCE COUNTER OFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
(S4 ' hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
t ) I hereby ACCEPT the foreoiylg SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
( ) I hereby reiect the foregoing (initials) 
JS 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing ail signatures 
* Signature or Buyensi / ( JDaie r ' Signatyrtoi Setter*s>S F— J- Date ( ) I personally caused a imai copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on J U . L V - ^ f " S *"* Cs 
19 by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the (X) Seller ( ) Buyer 
APPENDIX 3 
Letter, dated September 4, 1987 
RAY, OUINNEY £ NEBEKER 
P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
ALONZO W WATSON. JR. 
STEPHEN • NEBEKER 
MrrCHELL M E U C M 
L RtOO LARSON 
DON • ALLEN 
MERLJN O BAKER 
CLARK P OIL£S 
JAMES W FREED 
NARRVEL I HALL 
JAMES L WILDE 
M JOHN ASHTON 
H E R B E R T C UVSEY 
WILLIAM A MARSHALL 
JAMES 2 DAVIS 
J MICHAEL KELLY 
P A U L S PELT 
O C R A L O T SNOW 
ALAN A ENKE 
JONATHAN A DtSSLE 
SCOTT H CLARK 
STEVEN H GU NN 
JAMES S JARDINC 
KENT H MURDOCK 
JANET HUOIE SMITH 
DOUGLAS MATSUMORI 
ROBERT R HILL 
RICHARD O ALLEN 
ANTHONY W BCHOPIELD 
ALLEN L ORR 
BRAD D HARDY 
BRIAN E KATZ 
A. ROSERTTHORUR 
JOHN P HARRINGTON (COLO. * TEXAS) 
LARRY G MOORE 
ANTHONY • OUINN 
THOMAS L KAY 
SAUCE L OLSON 
JOHN A ADAMS 
DOUGLAS M MONSON 
CRAIG CARULE 
STEVEN W HARRIS 
RICHARD H CASPER 
JAMES M DC STEP "COLO. ONLYi 
KEVIN O GLADE 
JEFFREY 0 EISENSERG 
ENID GREENE 
LESTER K ESSIG 
IRA S RUSINFELO 
STEPHEN C TINGEY 
CRAIG L TAYLOR 
KELLY J FLINT 
MARK O MORRIS 
STEVEN J AESCH8ACHER 
RAUL D NEWMAN 
KEITH A KELLY 
4 0 0 O E S E R E T B U I L D I N O 
7S) S O U T H MAIM S T R E E T 
P\ O. S O X 4 S S S S 
SALT LAKE; CITY, UTAH 04145-0368 
T E L E P H O N E ( S O D B S t - l B O O 
TELECOPIER WO. (SOI) S S t - T S * S 
t l O F I R S T S E C U R I T Y S A N K B L D O . 
• t N O R T H U N I V E R S I T Y A V E N U E 
PROVO, UTAH 84601-4420 
( S O D 8 S S - 7 S I O 
I O S O F I R S T S E C U R I T Y S A N K S L D O . 
t * 0 * W A S H I N O T O N S O U L E V A R D 
OODCN, UTAH 64401*2306 
CSOI) S f t - O T I S 
or C O U N S E L 
ALBERT R. SOWEN 
W. J . O'CONNOR, JR. 
PAUL M. RAY ( t » S 3 - t » e 7 ) 
C. PRESTON ALLEN <1B1»-I«70 
MARVIN J . SERTOCH ( I9 I5- IQ7S) 
A. H. NEBEKER USSS-iQSO) 
S. J . OUINNEY USQ3- ISS3) 
September 4, 1987 
William Kelly 
Courtney Industries 
84 3 Nantasket Avenue 
Hull, Massachusetts 02045 
William Kelly 
P.O. Box 257 
Hull, Massachusetts 02045 
Re: Park City, Utah Property 
Dear Mr. Kelly: 
As you may be aware, this firm represents First Security Mortgage 
Company in a lawsuit against Mel and Herb Armstrong to establish 
correct boundaries and quiet title to certain land and water rights 
appurtenant to property located at 320 West Snows Lane in Park City, 
Utah. In February of this year you entered into negotiations with 
First Security for the purchase of the property. Those negotiations 
culminated in your acceptance on March 2nd of a counteroffer, dated 
February 27th, by First Security. The agreement provided for closing 
within 60 days of acceptance by the seller. However, the closing 
has been extended by several addenda, the last of which provided 
for closing by the end of August. The purpose cf this letter is 
to advise you that First Security is hereby extending the closing 
date to September 15, 1987, at which time First Security will consider 
the agreement to have terminated by its own terms. 
First Security is prepared to sell the property to you "fas 
is1 without warranty" in accordance with the terms of the earnest 
money agreement. First Security is also prepared to assign you its 
rights in the lawsuit against the Armstrongs. Absent any obligation 
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to the contrary or reimbursement from you for its legal costs and 
fees, First Security is no longer desirous of pursuing the lawsuit 
with the Armstrongs. First Security has not pursued the legal action 
against the Armstrongs as a result of any legal obligation, but simply 
because of its interest in closing the deal with you. First Security 
has never viewed itself as having the obligation to clear title, 
nor does the earnest money agreement provide for that obligation. 
Accordingly, as indicated above, First Security will sell the property 
in accordance with the terms of the earnest money agreement, as extended 
by this letter to September 15th. Otherwise, if you elect to refuse 
and walk away from the deal, First Security will return the $10,000.00 
earnest money deposited in escrow to you and pursue other alternatives. 
I am aware that you have some questions regarding the legal 
issues of the lawsuit and strongly encourage you tc obtain legal 
counsel to advise you concerning those issues. I will be happy to 
cooperate with whomever ycu select as counsel in order that you can 
make a fully informed judgment. Otherwise, if you would like to 
discuss this matter with me personally, please do not hesitate to 
call. If I do not hear from ycu or a representative by the close 
cf business on September 15th, I will consider the agreement as having 
expired and will have the funds in escrow returned tc you. 
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. I sincerely* 
hope that this matter can be resolved quickly and in the best interests 
of all involved. 
Sincerely, 
RAJLi QUINNEY 6 NEBEKER 
CLT/jp 
cc. Wayne Lantz 
Dave Grant 
Don Griffin 
^V^ 
Taylor 
nnrr 
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Letter, dated September 17, 1987 
RAY, OUINNEY £ NEBEKER 
P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
ALONZO W WATSON. JR. 
STEPHEN B NEBEKER 
MITCHELL MELICH 
L RIDO LARSON 
DON B ALLEN 
MERLIN O BAKER 
CLARK P GILES 
JAMES W FREED 
NARRVEL E HALL 
JAMES L WILDE 
M JOHN ASHTON 
HERBERT C LIVSEY 
WILLIAM A MARSHALL 
JAMES Z DAVIS 
J M I C H A E L KELLY 
P A U L S FELT 
G E R A L D T SNOW 
ALAN A ENKE 
JONATHAN A DIBBLE 
SCOTT H CLARK 
STEVEN H G U N N 
JAMES S JAROINE 
KENT H MURDOCK 
JANET HUGIE SMITH 
DOUGLAS MATSUMORI 
ROBERT P HILL 
R ICHARD G ALLEN 
ANTHONY W SCHOFIELD 
ALLEN L ORR 
BRAO D HARDY 
BRIAN E KAT2 
A ROBERT THORUP 
JOHN P HARRINGTON «COLO. * TEXAS* 
LARRY G MOORE 
ANTHONY B OUINN 
THOMAS L KAY 
BRUCE L OLSON 
JOHN A ADAMS 
DOUGLAS M MONSON 
CRAIG CARLILE 
STEVEN W HARRIS 
RICHARD H CASPER 
JAMES M DESTER iCOLO. ONLY* 
KEVIN G GLADE 
JEFFREY D EISENBERG 
ENID GREENE 
LESTER K ESSIG 
IRA B RUBINFELO 
STEPHEN C TINGEY 
CRAIG L TAYLOR 
KELLY J FLINT 
MARK O MORRIS 
STEVEN J AESCHBACHER 
PAUL D NEWMAN 
KEITH A KELLY 
September 17, 1987 
«00 OESERCT BUILOINO 
79 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P O BOX 403BS 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0365 
T E L E P H O N E ( B O D S 3 E - I S O O 
TKWKCORtCR MO <«Ol> t 9 t * 7 S « a 
* l O r i R S T S E C U R I T Y B A N K B L D O . 
O E N O R T H U N I V E R S I T Y A V E N U E 
PROVO, UTAH e<460l-«M20 
(BOD £26*7210 
I O E O F I R S T S E C U R I T Y B A N K B L O O 
< 4 0 4 W A S H I N G T O N B O U L E V A R D 
OODCN, UTAH 6 4 4 0 I - 2 3 0 6 
(•Ol) 6 E I - 0 7 I 3 
or eouNtci 
ALBERT R BOWCN 
W. J. O'CONNOR. JR 
PAUL H RAY (IB03-IO67) 
C PRESTON ALLEN (I02M07D 
MARVIN J BERTOCH (1019*1070) 
A M NEBEKER (IBOS-lOeO) 
S J OUINNCY (IB93-I063) 
HAND DELIVERED 
David Olsen 
Dan W. Egan 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & 
175 South West Temple, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
HANSON 
700 
Re: First Security Bank's Sale of 320 West 
Snows Lane Property in Park City to 
William Kelly 
Dear David and Dan: 
This letter is in response to your request on September 15th 
that First Security extend the closing date for the sale of the Park 
City property to the end of the month. My letter addressed to Dan, 
dated September 14, 1987, indicated that First Security would extend 
the closing date to September 22, 1987. First Security is not willing 
to grant an additional extension. Nor is First Security willing 
to extend credit at the rate provided in the Earnest Money Agreement 
beyond the period specified therein. As previously indicated, First 
Security is prepared to sell the property to Mr. Kelly "'as is1 
without warranty" in accordance with the terms of the Earnest Money 
Agreement. First Security is not obligated to clear title prior 
to conveying the property to Mr. Kelly. Any suggestion that the 
limiting language mentioned above refers only to personal property 
is absurd. 
Once again, if the sale is not closed by close of business on 
September 22nd, First Security will return the $10,000.00 earnest 
money deposited in escrow and pursue other alternatives. First 
Security will not consider the act of placing $140,000.00 in escrow 
as sufficient to close the deal. 
Exhibit "C" 
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In our conversation you indicated that one of Mr. Kelly's 
concerns was the prospect of pursuing a lawsuit against his 
neighbors should he buy the property with the lawsuit at this time. 
I previously made the offer to Don Griffin that First Security would 
be willing to extend the closing and pursue the lawsuit against the 
Armstrongs if Mr. Kelly is willing to pay the attorney's fees and 
costs associated with pursuing that action. I am willing to discuss 
this proposal with you, but this question must be resolved prior 
to the 22nd of September. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
RA>n QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
— Craig L./Jfaylor 
CLT/jp 
cc. Wayne Lantz 
Dave Grant 
0118 
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be t t er , dated September 22, 1987 
r«ANClS H. SUITTC* 
L * R O Y S. A K L A N O 
6*tCNT R. A I » M « T « O N O 
STCWAITT M . H A N S O N , J« . 
WILLIAM L. PnATC* 
O A V I O P. O L A C N 
Snucc T. J O N C S 
j t w o L O 0 . O L O » O * O 
RlCHAMO J . U W » C N C t 
rHANCt* J . CA»NCT 
J . MlCMACU HANICN 
C A P L f. Mu*rNC» 
MlCMACU W. HOMCM 
O A N W. C G A N 
rwco P. Si LV e r r en 
CHCMlC P. SHANTfAU 
MlCHAfL L. ALLIN 
C M A A U C S P. S A M P S O N 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
A UTAH **OTCMlONA4. LAW COP*0«ATlO* 
S E V E N T H T L O O R 
C L A R K L E A M I N G O m C E C E N T E R 
173 S O U T H W E S T T E M P L E 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 * iOM*80 
TELEPHONE (801) 332-7300 
CABLE AOOBC3S: SAXLAW 
TCLCX: * S 3 « 5 7 
TCLCCOPiCP: (60 i ) 3 3 2 - 7 3 5 5 
PARK CITY, UTAH 
(so») e « 9 * 4 0 0 o 
September 22, 1987 
HAND DELIVERED 
Craig L. Taylor, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: First Security Mortgage Company/William Kelley 
643 Snow Lane, Park City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Taylor: 
As we have discussed, this office represents William 
Kelley, Jr. By date of September 4, 1987, you sent Mr. Kelley a 
letter demanding that he must close on certain property located in 
Park City, Utah on or before September 15, 1987. In that letter, 
you advised Mr. Kelley that he should retain the services of an 
attorney. The letter was sent over the Labor Day weekend and Mr. 
Kelley was unable to contact our office until September 9, 1987. 
He traveled to Utah immediately to meet with us and was here the 
weekend following Labor Day. 
Despite the offer in your letter that First Security 
would cooperate in all ways with Mr. Kelley, that has not been 
the case. First, Mr. Kelley has requested a reasonable time within 
which to review the problem. First Security assumed the defense 
of the action and sought to clear title to the property and the 
water rights. On short notice and over a Labor Day weekend, First 
Security attempted to give Mr. Kelley five business days within 
which he must perform. Such was a totally unreasonable time based 
upon the fact that First Security had been involved with the problem 
for several months. Mr. Kelley could not travel to Utah and be 
advised of the situation in five days. You offered to make your 
files available, but this was not the case. Dan Egan went to your 
office pursuant to an appointment to review the files. Apparently 
because of a busy schedule, you were unable to meet with him. 
Subsequently, we received a copy of the Complaint and Answer only. 
We requested and were told we would be given copies of documents 
relating to water and water rights. This is critical, as the 
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Armstrongs have shut off the water which was in existence at the 
time my client signed the Earnest Money. Nevertheless, those docu-
ments have not been forthcoming. 
First Security Mortgage Company has totally frustrated 
my client's ability to perform. It has placed unreasonable demands 
on the time of performance and has deprived him of information 
necessary to evaluate the status of the property for which First 
Security undertook an action to clear title. The unreasonable 
demands of First Security have placed an extreme hardship on my 
client. The Earnest Money was signed on February 20, 1987. He 
has marketed properties and incurred losses resulting from First 
Security's delay in being able to close on the Agreement. These 
losses are not less than $4,000 per month. Nevertheless, despite 
these facts, First Security has acted in a most arbitrary and 
unreasonable manner in this action and has attempted to frustrate 
Mr. Kelley's performance under the contract. 
My client hereby tenders the down payment owed pursuant 
to the Earnest Money and Receipt to Purchase and all amendments 
thereto. My calculation is that the down payment is to be $130,000; 
$10,000 has earlier been placed in escrow which is to be a part of 
the down payment, requiring payment of $120,000. As we have seen 
no closing statements, notes, deeds or mortgages, we are uncertain 
as to the exact amount of cash necessary to close. Therefore, 
Mr. Kelley has wired $140,000 to Williamsburg Savings Bank to be 
held in an account and applied to closing. This tender is condi-
tioned only upon First Security honoring its obligations pursuant 
to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and delivering the property 
free from those defects which it has undertaken to cure. Mr. Kelley 
further requests that First Security resolve the issue regarding 
the water rights to the pond immediately in front of the home. 
As you are aware, this pond was full and was marketed as a part 
of the property. Through First Security's actions, the Armstrongs 
acted to cut off the water and deprive Mr. Kelley of the water 
rights. This problem needs to be resolved prior to closing so 
that Mr. Kelley actually receives that for which he contracted. 
The pond is essential to the aesthetics of the home and the prop-
erty. 
Although First Security has demanded a closing on Sep-
tember 22 and has refused to extend the closing for a reasonable 
period to allow Mr. Kelley to inspect that with which First Security 
has been involved for months, First Security still has not complied 
with the contract and provided copies of the mortgage and promissory 
notes which it seeks signed as a part of closing. It has not in 
any sense complied with its obligations pursuant to the Agreement. 
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As we earlier discussed, my client strongly desires to 
purchase the property and will not knuckle under to First Security's 
strong-arm tactics. We have filed this day an action seeking 
declaratory judgment and an interpretation of the contract. Mr. 
Kelley has asked the Court to interpret the propriety and fairness 
of the positions asserted by First Security. We will also ask 
the Court to determine if the strong-arm tactics of First Security 
are merely an effort to drive my client away from property which 
he has contracted to purchase, is capable of buying and wants as 
a residence for he and his family so that the property can be sold 
to others in a manner which will net a greater return to First 
Security. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
David R. Olsen 
db 
cci Mr. William R. Kelley, Jr. 
